Thursday, August 11, 2005

9/11 Commission enAbles Danger

Whenever a government committee is as pompously high on its own virtue as the 9/11 Commission was, you should immediately smell a rat (and not a tasty fried rat purchased in a Bolivian marketplace, but a stinky sewer rat that is suffering from leprosy and just crawled out of a storm drain and died). Apparently, the 9/11 Commission closed their minds early in the investigation and ignored important evidence that didn’t jibe with their preconceived notions. Specifically, they ignored important information collected by a military intelligence project called Able Danger, which used data mining to discover the terrorist (er, Insurgent-American) tendencies of one Mohommed Atta.

Michelle Malkin has a roundup. Thanks for nuthin’ 9/11 Commission!

Update: John Podhoretz (writing in the corner) has more on the importance of this outrage:

In a story filed at 7:10 PM, the Associated Press is now confirming all the particulars of what will now forever be called the Able Danger disaster. The 9/11 Commission staff did hear about intelligence-gathering efforts that hit pay dirt on the whereabouts of Mohammed Atta -- in 1999 -- and deliberately chose to omit word of those efforts.

And why? Because to do so might upset the timeline the Commission had established on Atta.

And why is that significant? Because the Mohammed Atta timeline established by the Commission pointedly insisted Atta did not meet with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague.

And why is that significant? Because debunking the Atta-Iraq connection was of vital importance to Democrats, who had become focused almost obsessively on the preposterous notion that there was no relation whatever between Al Qaeda and Iraq -- that Al Qaeda and Iraq might even have been enemies.

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